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3.  Knowledge and beliefs in economics: 
the case of the Austrian tradition 
 Richard Arena and Agnès Festré
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The Austrians contributed to the analysis of  the impact of  individual 
knowledge and beliefs on economic activity more than any other School 
in the history of economic thought. This statement should not surprise the 
reader. The founding fathers of this school are strongly associated with a 
subjectivist conception of  economics, in which cognitive capacities and 
the level of information of individual agents play an essential role in the 
explanation of their decision-making processes. They also spent a signifi cant 
amount of time researching topics that are of the utmost importance to 
anyone interested in the role played by knowledge and beliefs in economics: 
Menger dedicated a lot of attention to the problem of the emergence of 
institutions and behavioural rules and placed great emphasis on the role 
played by the process of  diffusion of  beliefs within this context; Böhm-
Bawerk dealt with the frontiers of pure economic theory and was interested 
in the impact of power and social relations on economic activity (Böhm-
Bawerk 1914). As for Wieser, he built a real economic sociology approach 
and underlined the infl uence of organizational and social interactions in 
this context.
In this chapter, we shall concentrate on the second generation of Austrian 
economists, in particular on the contributions of  von Mises, Hayek and 
Schumpeter who, despite developing very different approaches, shared many 
features of the intellectual vein of the founding fathers of the School.
At fi rst sight, the subjectivist stance of most Austrian authors suggests 
that they attached importance to the role of individual beliefs in economic 
activity. It also suggests that these economists were reluctant to deal 
with social norms or collective beliefs. We will, however, show that their 
approaches are more complex than might appear at fi rst sight. On the 
one hand, von Mises, Hayek and Schumpeter had divergent views of 
individual decision-making processes. On the other hand, and insofar 
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as they advocated methodological individualism, they had to tackle the 
problem of inter-individual co-ordination. The way they solved this problem 
differed substantially and did not always exclude, as we shall see, a recourse 
to collective beliefs or social rules in their analyses. In short, our reading of 
the contributions of von Mises, Hayek and Schumpeter is an attempt at a 
more thorough analysis of the role of individual and collective beliefs in 
the working of markets. It also allows us to see how a strictly subjectivist 
approach to economic behaviour and rationality can come up against 
serious problems relating to inter-individual co-ordination. To mention 
but a few: 
• how to describe the nature of  the state (or states) of  the economy 
that result from individual agents’ choices through direct or indirect 
interactions? 
• Does this state or these states imply a prior agreement on collective 
beliefs by individual agents? 
• How should optimality issues be dealt with?
These types of questions will be guiding our reading of the three Austrian 
authors considered in this chapter. 
3.2  LUDWIG VON MISES: APRIORISM AND 
INDIVIDUAL BELIEFS
Ludwig von Mises undoubtedly holds a special place in the second 
generation of  the Austrian School. First, he is generally thought of  as 
the eldest representative of this generation, since he was the fi rst to bring 
about changes to the message delivered by the founding fathers of  the 
Vienna School. Secondly, he played a fundamental role in the creation 
of  the modern ‘American’ version of  this School. Finally, von Mises is 
very often associated with the defence of  radical subjectivism. This is 
very pertinent to our issue at hand. We shall, therefore, fi rst examine the 
analytical consequences this defence implies.
3.2.1 Decision and Human Action in von Mises
As suggested by the title of his fundamental 1949 work, Human Action: A 
Treatise of Economics, von Mises starts from the notion of ‘human action’, 
which he takes as the basic unit of  his analysis, and defi nes ‘purposeful 
behaviour’, as a ‘will put into operation and transformed into an agency’, 
the purpose of which consists in ‘a person’s conscious adjustment to the 
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state of the universe that determines his life’ (von Mises [1949] 1996, p. 11), 
or, to be more precise, in ‘the satisfaction of the acting man’s desire’ (ibid., 
p. 14). This conception of  human action from which von Mises tries to 
build a general theory – praxeology – derives from the Kantian philosophic 
tradition. In this perspective, von Mises considers that logical reasoning is 
the main engine of human activity (von Mises [1962] 1979, p. 44). It means, 
for the author, that the ‘category’ of human action is part of the structure 
of the spirit itself. To put it differently, any argumentation based on a priori 
true assertions and on a sequence of well-formulated logical stages leads to 
absolutely certain conclusions.
This constitutes the fi rst foundation of von Mises’s ‘apriorist’ approach. 
However, this methodological principle is not suffi cient to characterize 
his approach. On the one hand, according to von Mises, every economic 
and social fact can be reduced to a theoretical statement. On the other 
hand, these statements can not be ‘tested’ empirically or be the subject 
of confi rmation or falsifi cation procedures. The only two criteria of truth 
accepted by the author are the internal logical coherence of  a statement 
and its applicability in given historical situations. This apriorist conception 
therefore implies the refusal of an analysis of beliefs and human behaviour 
which would privilege their content or their empirical meaning. Praxeology 
concerns human action, ‘irrespective of all environmental, accidental, and 
individual circumstances of the concrete acts. Its cognition is purely formal 
and general without reference to the particular features of the actual case’ 
(ibid., p. 32). It also deals with the ‘ultimate category’ constituted by ‘the 
logical structure of human mind’ (Ibid. p. 34). It is in this sense that von 
Mises notes that the ‘fundamental logical relations are the indispensable 
prerequisite of perception, apperception and experience’. (ibid., p. 34).
However, von Mises’s apriorism does not exclude subjectivism. Indeed, 
he writes: 
[N]obody is in a position to substitute his own value judgments for those of the 
acting individual, it is vain to pass judgment on other people’s aims and volitions. 
(ibid., p. 19).
This subjectivism does not, however, adapt to unconscious determinants 
of  the decision process. Von Mises, as already emphasized, conceives of 
human action as deliberate behaviour or conscious adaptation. 
3.2.2 Human Action and Individual Beliefs
Von Mises’s subjectivism implies the existence of individual beliefs exclusive 
to every agent. He thus encounters the problem of co-ordination between 
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autonomous decisions and actions of actors (von Mises [1949] 1996, p. 55). 
This problem is all the more crucial as, for our author:
society is nothing but the combination of individuals for cooperative effort. It 
exists nowhere else than in the actions of individual men. It is a delusion to search 
for it outside the actions of  individuals. To speak of  a society’s autonomous 
and independent existence is a metaphor which can easily lead to crass errors. 
(Ibid., p. 143)
Von Mises’s apriorism, however, moderates his subjectivist individualism. 
In fact, two principles govern the logical structure that is common to 
everyone: the principle of  causality and the principle of  teleology (ibid., 
p. 25). These two principles play an essential role in von Mises’s analysis of 
the co-ordination of individual beliefs.
3.2.3 From Individual Beliefs to Inter-individual Co-ordination
In order to solve the problem of the compatibility between the subjectivist 
approach to individual beliefs and market co-ordination, von Mises starts 
from the idea of introspection:
it is beyond doubt that the principle according to which an Ego deals with every 
human being as if  the other were a thinking and acting being like himself  has 
evidenced its usefulness both in mundane life and in scientifi c research. It cannot 
be denied that it works. (Ibid., p. 24, cf. also von Mises ([1962] 1979, p. 72)
This idea is simple. Given that, for von Mises ‘it is impossible for the human 
mind to conceive a mode of  action whose categories would differ from 
the categories which determine our own actions (von Mises [1949] 1996, 
p. 29), agents, by introspection, can redraw the logical principles governing 
the ways of thinking of their allies or competitors. This is obviously only 
possible because it is assumed that every agent is endowed a priori with 
the same reasoning capacities. These are capacities ‘common to all man’ 
(ibid., p. 35).
In this context, introspection is only meaningful if  it is combined with 
‘observation’. In fact, although the logical categories of  causality and 
teleology are given a priori, this is not the case for the scale of  values or 
wants of the agents. In von Mises’s terms, this ‘manifests itself  only in the 
reality of action’, by means of observed behaviour (ibid., p. 95).
In other words, von Mises, in line with his constant preoccupation to 
carefully separate the fi eld of psychology from the one of economic analysis, 
rejects the possibility of interpreting this behaviour psychologically. 
So, if  agents can communicate by going beyond their strictly subjective 
universes, this is neither because they share the same cognitive capacities 
Arena 01 chap01   38 25/4/06   11:48:08
 The case of the Austrian tradition 39
(in the sense of the Hayekian possibilities of appropriation of the reality 
by the brain), nor because they have similar psychological profi les. It is 
because their spirit reveals the same logical structure. 
This logical structure leads agents to analyze real phenomena, albeit 
imperfectly, by using similar schemes, such as those implied by the principles 
of  teleology and causality. However, the agents’ knowledge is inevitably 
imperfect. In fact, agent behaviour is not governed by strictly deterministic 
laws. Besides, the principles of teleology and causality are not suffi cient to 
allow instant foresight of the future or the behaviour of other individuals. 
Thus, experience and observation enter the scene. Causality is revealed to 
agents only through the search for the ‘regularity and the “law”’ of observed 
phenomena (ibid. p. 22). 
The apriorist hypothesis of  the universality of  the logical categories 
which characterize the common structure of human minds thus constitutes, 
for von Mises, the necessary condition for the communication of beliefs 
between agents and for the understanding of  individual expectations. If  
this condition is necessary, it is however far from suffi cient. 
3.2.4 The Processes of Division of Individual Beliefs
Although von Mises champions radical subjectivist individualism, he 
does not endorse the contractualist explanation of the transition from the 
Natural State, where man was isolated, to the Social State, where man 
enters into connection with other people. For von Mises it is inconceivable 
to suppose that man can live ‘in abstracto’ (von Mises [1949] 1996, p. 46). 
Man is always located within a socio-cultural context, which infl uences 
his subjective choices. Far from being unimportant, this infl uence can be 
determining for certain agents.
All ‘common men’ do is adapt the ideas and beliefs they inherit from the 
past and\or from their environment. From this point of view, the description 
von Mises provides is striking – the common man:
does not himself create his ideas; he borrows them from other people. His ideology 
is what his environment enjoins upon him […] Common man does not speculate 
about the great problems. With regard to them, he relies upon other people’s 
authority, he behaves as ‘every decent fellow must behave’, he is like a sheep in 
the herd. (Ibid., p. 46)
These ‘common men’ are to be distinguished from those that von Mises calls 
the ‘promoters’. They are seen as ‘pacemakers’, ‘who have more initiative, 
more venturesomeness, and a quicker eye than the crowd’ (ibid., p. 255). The 
promoter is, above all, a pioneer and this is why von Mises also calls him 
the ‘creative genius’ (ibid., p. 139). His incentive ‘is not the desire to bring 
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about a result, but the act of producing it’ (ibid., p. 139). The promoters 
correspond to ‘a general characteristic of  human nature’ (ibid., p. 269) 
and that is why, as in Schumpeter, they exist in most societies, at different 
times or in different activities (ibid., pp. 255). In the context of  market 
economies, these promoters appear predominantly, according to von Mises, 
as entrepreneurs.
The distinction between ‘promoters’ or ‘creators’ and ‘ordinary men’ is 
important. First, it is a feature of the Austrian economic tradition inherited 
from Menger and Wieser (Arena and Gloria-Palermo 2001). Secondly, it 
allows us, according to von Mises, to explain the sharing, or rather the 
diffusion, of  new individual beliefs via a social process of  imitation. So, 
common men follow ‘habits’ or routines, which they modify only if  they 
are convinced that the promoters will improve their well-being (von Mises 
[1949] 1996, p. 47). In this sense, the individual beliefs of  common men 
are indeed shared individual beliefs; but, for von Mises, they can never be 
autonomous collective beliefs of individuals, as in Durkheim, for example 
(ibid., pp. 42–3).
The radical anti-holism of von Mises allows us to understand why his 
conception of the diffusion or the sharing of individual beliefs is related to 
imitation: if  several agents agree to adopt the specifi c beliefs of a particular 
individual, it does not mean that they stop exercising individual choices:
They can either all act together in accord, or one of them may act for them all. 
In the latter case the consideration of the others consists in their bringing about 
the situation which makes one man’s action effective for them too. (Ibid., 44).
This approach, in terms of  shared individual beliefs, appears coherent. 
Von Mises makes use of  it in order to analyze the functioning of  the 
market. The latter is not ‘a place’, ‘a thing’, or a ‘collective entity’ (ibid., 
p. 257), it is a ‘process’ in which ‘value judgments’ are compatible with 
individual beliefs (ibid.). Promoters-entrepreneurs play a leading role in this 
framework because they ‘take the lead’: they are ‘the shrewder individuals 
[who] appreciate conditions more correctly than the less intelligent and 
therefore succeed better in their actions.’ (ibid., p. 328). Their attentiveness 
and speculative behaviour focussed on the discovery of new opportunities 
are critical (ibid., p. 329), especially since, in the long run, they can only 
submit themselves to the ‘sovereignty of the consumers’. (ibid., p. 269).
Despite his views on the functioning of the market, von Mises did not go 
on to an operational analysis. If  one can credit the author for a stimulating 
approach to the role of the promoters-entrepreneurs, his ideas on the ways 
markets are organized did not lead to a theory of auctions. Although von 
Mises suggests that prices convey effi cient signals that lead to equilibrium 
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between production and exchange, he fails to explain how entrepreneurial 
activity leads to prices and why they ‘tell the producers what to produce, 
how to produce and in what quantity’ (ibid., p. 258). The omnipotence and 
the equilibrating character of  the market are not proved rigorously and, 
unfortunately, von Mises’ radical condemnation of the use of mathematics 
in economics cannot reassure the reader about this point (see, for instance, 
ibid., pp. 350–58). Moreover, it should be pointed out that von Mises’ analysis 
of the process of diffusion of individual beliefs is not restricted to the role 
of  the promoters since, in the last resort, the ‘sovereignty of consumers’ 
constitutes the prime mover of the market process (ibid. p. 269). 
Another factor explaining the sharing of individual beliefs is the ‘catallactic 
function of money’. Von Mises explicitly draws a parallel between money 
and the promoter, noting that ‘the notion of money [similarly to the notion 
of the entrepreneur-promoter] also defi es a rigid praxeological defi nition’ 
(ibid., p. 255).
First of all, a currency is not an a priori medium of exchange but a ‘tool 
of  action’ because ‘prices in currency are the only vehicle of  economic 
calculation’ (ibid., p. 201) and ‘monetary calculation is the guiding star of 
action’ (ibid., p. 210).
Moreover, monetary prices allow the comparison between alternative 
uses of resources over time, i.e., intertemporal calculation. The key-function 
of  money is to provide individuals with a scale against which to assess 
the future consequences of  their present actions. Money thus allows the 
introduction of the dimension of evaluation prior to human action, namely, 
the appreciation or anticipation by individuals of  alternative ways of 
removing the uneasiness they feel (ibid., p. 224). 
Secondly, money gives rise to an objective dimension through the notion 
of purchasing power. This is passed on to individuals and serves as a guide 
for action. According to von Mises, this does not mean that monetary 
calculation can be used for ‘any consideration which does not look at 
things from the point of  view of  individuals’ such as, for instance, the 
statistical forecast of aggregate economic magnitudes or the calculation of 
collective projects (ibid., p. 230). On the other hand, the specifi c function 
of money as a generalized medium of exchange confers it an objective 
dimension. 
Von Mises fi rst indicates that money is to be distinguished from other 
economic goods in the sense that its subjective value depends on an objective 
economic characteristic: its purchasing power. Contrary to the value of any 
other economic good, the purchasing power of money cannot be infl uenced 
by non-economic factors such as technology or the psychology of individuals 
(von Mises [1924] 1981, p. 118). Consequently, it is not necessary to base the 
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purchasing power of money on the existence of a demand for money as an 
instrument of exchange or for its use for industrial purposes:
That component of money’s purchasing power which is an outcome of the services 
it renders as a medium of  exchange is entirely explained by reference to these 
specifi c monetary services and the demand they create. (von Mises [1949] 1996, 
p. 409, our emphasis)
This passage illustrates the self-referential and conventional character of 
currency. In particular, the self-referential nature of money becomes clear 
when we consider that money would cease to exist were individuals to lose 
memory of purchasing power:
It is the fact that radically distinguishes the determination of  the purchasing 
power of money from the determination of the mutual exchange rates between 
the various vendible goods and services. … Knowledge about past prices is for 
the buyer merely a means to reap a consumer’s surplus. If  he were not intent 
upon this goal, he could, if  need be, arrange his purchases without any familiarity 
with the market prices of the immediate past, which are popularly called present 
prices. He could make value judgments without appraisal. … But if knowledge 
about money’s purchasing power were to fade away, the process of development 
indirect exchange and media of exchange would have to start anew. (Ibid., p. 411, 
our emphasis)
Although the analysis of the role of money proposed by von Mises is worth 
considering, it does not provide a rigorous analysis of the formation of the 
monetary prices of commodities. All we can say is that it is left as a possible 
line of research.
On the whole, von Mises’s approach does not provide a satisfactory 
analysis of the impact of individual beliefs and shared individual beliefs 
on the functioning of a market economy. However, it highlights some of 
the diffi culties confronting a strictly subjectivist approach to beliefs. 
3.3  FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK: INDIVIDUAL 
BELIEFS AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOCIETY
Among the important economists of  the twentieth century, Hayek is 
undisputedly the one who contributed the most to the analysis of the role 
of knowledge in economic activity. The scope of his epistemological thought 
remains unmatched in this fi eld. No wonder, therefore, that Hayek belongs 
to the group of Austrian economists who tried to connect individual beliefs, 
social knowledge and the functioning of  market economies. In order to 
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better justify Hayeks’ presence in this section, we must fi rst turn to his 
conception of knowledge.
3.3.1 Hayek’s Conception of Knowledge
One can fi nd Hayek’s best defi nition of knowledge in his 1960 work entitled 
The Constitution of Liberty:
The growth of knowledge and the growth of civilization are the same only if  we 
interpret knowledge to include all human adaptations to environment in which 
past experience has been incorporated. Not all knowledge in this sense is part 
of our intellect, nor is our intellect the whole of our knowledge. Our habits and 
skills, our emotional attitudes, our tools, and our institutions – all are in this sense 
adaptations to past experience which have grown up by selective elimination of 
less suitable contact. They are as much an indispensable foundation of successful 
actions as is our conscious knowledge (Hayek [1960], p. 26)
This passage provides a good illustration of the reasons that lead Hayek 
to believe that individual knowledge involves more than simply ‘explicit 
and conscious knowledge’ (ibid., p. 25). Fleetwood (1997, pp. 164–6) 
compellingly argues that Hayek’s broad conception of knowledge includes 
three main forms of knowledge: general explicit knowledge, local explicit 
knowledge (ibid., p. 165) and tacit and unconscious knowledge. This last 
form of  knowledge is essential to Hayek’s analysis. It also illustrates a 
fundamental difference between Hayek and the approach adopted by von 
Mises. While von Mises’s apriorism led him to consider exclusively conscious 
individual forms of beliefs and knowledge, Hayek’s methodological choice 
paves the way for a broader conception of knowledge.
In fact, tacit knowledge refers to a form of knowledge that is accessible 
directly: unlike local and general explicit forms of knowledge, it does not 
require the preliminary defi nition of an objective to be deliberately learnt. It 
is fully ‘absorbed’, day after day, through the social interaction common to 
every individual from early childhood. It is not assimilated through formal 
institutions but instead by the repeated resort to rules of social conduct, the 
role or even meaning of which is not necessarily understood. The originality 
of  Hayek’s conception of  tacit knowledge lies in its extensibility. More 
precisely, the behavioural rules that underlie tacit knowledge in Hayek’s 
approach are not limited to practical and basic forms of behaviour. They 
can also relate to elaborate cultural traditions or professional routines.
More generally, Hayek’s conception of knowledge must be understood 
in relation to his subjectivist methodology, which essentially rests on two 
justifi cations.
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The fi rst, which is cognitive, is found in The Sensory Order (1952). In this 
book, Hayek champions the idea that the brain functions in a connectionist 
way, so that the point of  departure of  mental representations is not the 
physical order of things, as ‘scientistic objectivism’, to use Hayek’s expression 
(cf. Hayek (1952a) chapter V), would have it, ‘but the product of abstractions 
which the mind must possess in order to be capable of experiencing that 
richness of the particular [of the reality]’ (Hayek 1978, p. 44). The conscious 
experiences that individuals regard as relatively concrete and primary and 
which they attribute to the intrinsic properties of  the physical order ‘are 
the product of  a superimposition of  many ‘classifi cations’ of  the events 
perceived according to their signifi cance in many respects’ (ibid., p. 36). 
There are thus as many subjective forms of knowledge as there are individual 
‘nervous systems’, i.e., as there are heterogeneous agents.
The second justifi cation for Hayekian subjectivism is found in what 
Hayek calls the ‘social division of knowledge’. For Hayek, as a civilization 
develops, the knowledge of its society becomes more complex and specialist. 
However, no individual agent can have access, to such knowledge alone. 
This is dispersed within society and each of  the individuals constituting 
it can have access only to a very small part of the social knowledge and, 
in particular, to the processes by which social and economic activity is 
regulated and reproduced globally.
It is against the background of  these two justifi cations that we are to 
understand the very wide conception of  knowledge Hayek developed. 
In this perspective, the existence of  tacit knowledge does not constitute 
a phenomenon to be analyzed in itself. Instead, it represents one of  the 
essential forms of dispersed knowledge, which is diffi cult to disseminate in 
society and which Hayek endeavours to characterize.
3.3.2 Knowledge and Individual Beliefs
Hayek’s subjectivist methodological choice leads him to investigate the 
features of a ‘cognitive’ individual rationality, to use the distinction between 
cognitive and instrumental rationalities used by Boudon in this volume. The 
cognitive capacities that individual agents must mobilize refer to their own 
‘mental map’. What Hayek calls the ‘map’ is ‘the semi-permanent apparatus 
of classifi cation’, which ‘provides the different generic elements from which 
the models of particular situations are built’. (Hayek, 1952b, p. 89). 
In fact, the idea of  a mental map conveys the cognitive limits of  the 
mental considerations of  individuals. Rather than ‘a sort of  schematic 
picture of  the environment’ it supplies ‘a sort of  inventory of  the kinds 
of things of which the world is built up, a theory of how the world works’ 
(ibid., p. 89). For Hayek, this approach does not confl ict with some of the 
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tools commonly used in microeconomics, what he calls the formal ‘logic 
of  the choice’. However, he thinks they require adaptation. So, during 
the debate on ‘socialist calculation’, Hayek underlines the fundamentally 
subjective representation according to which agents interpret the ‘data’ or 
‘fundamentals’ of  the general economic equilibrium scheme, such as the 
qualities of consumer goods or the description and implementation of the 
available techniques of production (Hayek 1935).
Therefore, the economic behaviour of each individual agent is embedded 
in the framework of his own theory of how the world works. It means that 
each individual makes decisions according to his own set of  ‘structural’ 
individual beliefs, to use Walliser’s terminology in this volume. These 
structural beliefs shape what we could call ‘circumstantial’ beliefs, namely, 
beliefs which govern specifi c decisions related to particular circumstances 
and to particular expected economic results at a given point of time.
These decisions give rise to actions which, in their turn, produce results 
which the agent compares to his own expectations. The divergence perceived 
by the individual between his expectations and the actual outcomes of his 
actions leads him to revise his circumstantial and sometimes, albeit less 
frequently, his structural beliefs. This revision process is stronger when 
the observation of actual results convinces the agent of the ‘errors’ in his 
‘attempt’ and provides him with the opportunity to eliminate certain beliefs. 
If, on the other hand, the ‘attempt’ is successful, a true selection of beliefs 
takes place. Indeed, in the long run, as pointed out by Garrouste (1999, 
p. 891), structural beliefs become stronger and are gradually transformed 
into individual abstract rules, comparable to genuine routines. In fact, the 
agent becomes aware that his structural beliefs help him obtain results that 
are superior to the other possible beliefs. 
However, despite the fact that individual beliefs are subjective, they are 
not independent from those of the other agents.
3.3.3 Individual Beliefs and Social Rules
If economic agents were only to follow their beliefs and individual routines, 
it would be diffi cult to understand how even a minimal social order could 
result from a multitude of  unco-ordinated economic actions. Hayek is 
clearly aware of this problem which, he believes, arises out of the need to 
distinguish ‘social phenomena’ or group actions from ‘individual actions’ 
(Hayek 1948 p. 48). This problem turns out to be particularly complex for 
two main reasons.
First of all, co-ordination of individual behaviours is contextual. This 
observation is not surprising in a Hayekian context: here ‘fundamentals’ are 
allowed to vary continuously and, moreover, it is impossible to grasp them 
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objectively, even at a given point in time (Arena 1999, p. 851). Referring to 
the context thus implies that the same set of individual rules of conduct 
can lead to very different social orders, if  the context is associated with 
different ‘circumstances of time and place’.
Secondly, there is some divergence between the strictly individual motives 
of agents and the criteria allowing the ranking of preferences in favour of 
one social order instead of another: Hayek actually notes ‘that there is no 
other way toward an understanding of social phenomena but through our 
understanding of individual actions directed toward the people and guided 
by their expected behavior’. (Hayek 1948, p. 6). Moreover, ‘the reason for 
this is simply that […] wholes or social structures are never given to us as 
natural units, are not defi nite objects given to observation, that we never 
deal with the whole of reality but always only with a selection made with 
the help of our models’ (ibid., p. 74).
In this context, it seems that there is a signifi cant gap between the rules 
that govern the pursuit of  individual self-interest and those allowing the 
emergence of  a social order: ‘knowledge of  society’ cannot be reduced 
to the sum of  individual beliefs. As shown by Vanberg (1986), this is a 
serious problem in Hayek because he is unable to provide a convincing 
framework ensuring the compatibility between his subjectivist approach to 
the spontaneous order and his later theory of ‘cultural evolution’. However, 
a fi rst answer can be sketched out based on his writings.
In considering Hayek’s cognitive approach, Birner (1999, pp. 67–8) 
underlines the analogy, developed by Hayek himself, between the organization 
of the human brain and that of society. This marks the limits of Hayekian 
subjectivism, because ‘knowledge and beliefs of  different people’ are 
not completely diverse but ‘possess a common structure which makes 
communication possible’ (Hayek 1952b, p. 49). In this perspective:
individuals which compose society are guided in their actions by a classifi cation 
of things or events according to a system of sense qualities and of concepts which 
has a common structure and which we know because we, too, are men. […]. Not 
only men’s action toward external objects but also all the relations between men 
and all the social institutions can be understood only by what men think about 
them. Society as we know it is, as it were, built up from the concepts and ideas 
held by the people, and social phenomena can be recognized by us and have 
meaning to us only as they are refl ected in the minds of  men. (Hayek 1952a, 
pp. 57–8, our emphasis)
This therefore implies that the rules of conduct which guide the behaviour 
of agents are clearly dependent on the mental ‘common structure’ of men. 
Thus it is easy to understand why Hayek admits that individuals belonging to 
the same historic and/or socio-cultural environment tend to share common 
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individual beliefs. This viewpoint is obviously reinforced by the importance 
Hayek attributes to the relation between innovative and imitative individual 
decisions in the process of emergence of behavioural regularities. 
Vanberg (1986) notes that this approach is still unsatisfactory: if  the self-
organization of the agents is the emanation of individual choices, it does 
not however lead inevitably to a socially optimal state. Hayek postulates 
the social superiority of  the market order without demonstrating it in a 
convincing way, when he refers to the notion of ‘empirical tendency toward 
equilibrium’, or to a notion close to Pareto’s optimum or even to the idea 
that there exists a dominant social group (cf. Arena 2003). If  one wants to 
abandon this type of petitio principii, one should go back to the notion of 
social order and its foundations in a Hayekian perspective. However, before 
we examine them, it is necessary, fi rst, to pay attention to the concept of 
social rule in Hayek.
3.3.4 Social Rules and Collective Beliefs
Up until this point, we used the word ‘beliefs’ in the sense of ‘individual 
beliefs’. We saw at fi rst how these beliefs could give rise to a self-reinforcement 
process and thus lead to the emergence of real individual rules of conduct. 
We then underlined how agents could converge towards shared individual 
beliefs, through social communication and imitation. One could thus infer 
from these two observations that, in Hayek, the social rules of  conduct 
that explain the regularity and co-ordination of  individual behaviour 
may, in turn, be defi ned as shared individual rules. In fact, the situation is 
more complex.
As some commentators have noted (Ioannides 1999, pp. 874–6; Garrouste 
1999, pp. 887–91), the features of  social rules of  conduct that in Hayek 
underline the formation of a spontaneous social order similar to the one 
found in market societies, are threefold. First, they must be tacit, that 
is, ‘supra-conscious’, to use Hayek’s expression. To put it another way, 
individuals follow rules of conduct, without knowing explicitly that they are 
doing so. Secondly, these rules must be abstract. Thirdly, tacit and abstract 
rules must necessarily be general. This means that they must be valid for all 
individuals and apply to an infi nite number of particular cases. To put it 
another way, the content of these rules is independent from the particular 
individuals who adopt them or from the particular types of actions in which 
they are put into practice. This does not mean that their ultimate origin 
is not linked to the individual beliefs of agents. Simply, these rules are the 
result of a process of adaptation which tends to gradually erase its origin 
(Hayek 1960, p. 27).
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With the passing of  time and the repeated use of  individual rules of 
conduct, their tendency to become more and more abstract and general 
creates the conditions of their growing autonomy vis-à-vis the individuals 
who have implemented and/or adopted them. In the long run, these forms 
of conduct ‘consist of what we call “traditions” and “institutions”, which 
we use because they are available to us as a product of cumulative growth 
without either having been designed by any one mind’. (Ibid., p. 27).
This interpretation is confi rmed by Hayek’s analysis of the ‘properties’ 
that social rules are supposed to possess in order to produce a global order 
that appears to be independent from individual actions. These ‘properties’ 
explain how individual rules (even shared rules) can be transformed into 
social rules, i.e. ‘normative’ rules which ‘tell’ individuals what they can or 
cannot do. As we already noted, the social process of standardization of 
rules fi rst results from similarities between individual mental processes. Its 
origin can also be found in the existence of a ‘common cultural tradition’. 
Finally, it can be enforced by, say, the State or the law, and imply sanctions 
in case of violation. The above remarks confi rm that social facts or norms 
have gradually acquired such a large autonomy with respect to individuals, 
that they appear to them as strictly exogenous (customs, convention, culture, 
law, etc.). This is why they appear to be the real causes of the process of 
social standardization of individual rules. Therefore, if  shared individual 
beliefs often imply true social beliefs, it is mainly because individuals usually 
choose their individual rules of conduct within the repertoire of the available 
social rules.
It then remains to understand how the mechanism of selection between 
rules and available social beliefs works. This mechanism is essential 
since it allows us to understand the emergence of rules or optimal social 
beliefs. The answer Hayek puts forward corresponds to his theory of 
cultural evolution:
All that we can know is that the ultimate decision about what is good or bad will 
be made not by individual human wisdom but by the decline of the groups that 
have adhered to the ‘wrong’ beliefs. (Hayek 1960, p. 36)
However, one can still wonder how the process of selection of social rules 
leads to a situation of relative autonomy with respect to individual knowledge 
beliefs, even if  Hayek strongly advocates subjectivist individualism. This 
autonomy is taken into account by Hayek through his reference to the 
‘knowledge of society’ (ibid., p. 25).
Individuals have no direct access to this kind of knowledge (ibid. p. 25). 
On the other hand, for Hayek, the simultaneous recourse, by individuals, 
to their own particular knowledge leads each of them to benefi t from what 
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one could call positive externalities stemming from social interaction. All 
that remains then is to understand how individuals can benefi t indirectly 
from this knowledge.
Hayek’s answer is obvious: tradition provides agents with a set of 
rules that are superior or ‘wiser’ than human reason (Hayek 1988, p. 73). 
Fleetwood elaborates on this answer, noting that: ‘by drawing upon these 
rules as surrogates, then, agents avail themselves of the collective wisdom 
of an evolving society, and are thereby enabled to initiate socioeconomic 
activity, although they can never know or articulate this collective wisdom.’ 
(Fleetwood 1997, p. 170).
To sum up, Hayek actually allows for the existence of a ‘knowledge of 
society’, or ‘of the impersonal process of society’, which differs from the 
mere juxtaposition of individual kinds of knowledge (Hayek 1960, p. 65). 
This means that, for Hayek, we must distinguish between two analytical 
levels (see for instance, ibid., p. 28). The fi rst is entirely governed by the 
methodology of  subjectivist individualism and, therefore, only refers to 
individual beliefs, be they shared or not. The second corresponds to a kind 
of knowledge that individuals cannot access directly. It is the outcome of the 
interactive effects of their actions. In order for this impersonal knowledge 
to be as effi cient as possible, it is fi rst necessary that a social process of 
selection generate rules allowing men to live together in an open society, 
in other words, in a type of social order that permits individuals to make 
free but compatible decisions. It is also necessary that these selected rules 
produce the largest and best ‘knowledge of society’.
It is on this last point that Hayek’s failure is self-evident: the author fails 
to provide a satisfactory explanation of  the social effects of  individual 
beliefs on the working of market economies. Like von Mises, Hayek takes 
the tendency of  the market to move towards equilibrium for granted 
without proving it rigorously. His solution is, however, more elaborate 
– essentially because of its ability to take into account the tacit as well as 
the unconscious aspects of individual knowledge. Moreover, through the 
introduction of the analytical device of the ‘knowledge of society’, it entails 
an evolutionary dimension which did not exist in von Mises. This level of 
knowledge turns out to be essential for Hayek’s intellectual construct, but 
its relative autonomy does not question the individualistic and subjectivist 
methodology of the author since no individual is capable of appropriating 
it directly. Finally, if  one is willing to place Hayek’s treatment of knowledge 
into a framework based on self-organization and if one gives up the postulate 
of a determinist and systematic tendency of the economy towards a unique 
and stable equilibrium, Hayek’s solution seems more promising than the 
one put forward by von Mises.
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3.4  JOSEPH SCHUMPETER: THE SOCIAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL BELIEFS
At fi rst sight, it might seem surprising that we chose to include Schumpeter’s 
contribution in this chapter. Although Schumpeter was born within the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, he is not usually considered as a member of 
the so-called Austrian School. However, this hesitation does not stand up 
to scrutiny. Schumpeter was strongly infl uenced by the fi rst generation of 
the School in particular, by von Wieser (Arena and Gloria-Palermo 2001). 
Moreover, he dedicated a great number of  contributions to the study of 
rationality and individual beliefs (see above all Schumpeter [1940] 1991), 
a point that is often neglected in the literature. This is why we believe that 
his contribution deserves particular attention.
3.4.1  The Schumpeterian Analysis of the Foundations of Beliefs and 
Individual Motives
According to Donzelli (1983, p. 639), Schumpeter was the fi rst to introduce 
the expression ‘methodological individualism’. In fact, an entire chapter 
of his 1908 work entitled Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen 
Nationalökonomie is dedicated to providing a precise defi nition and to a 
detailed discussion of methodological individualism and its main alternative: 
methodological holism. The approach privileged by Schumpeter does not 
consist in establishing the superiority of one of these two methods over the 
other but in specifying their respective domains of relevance.
One of  the fundamental purposes of  the author in this context is to 
estimate the impact of  the existence of  social classes or groups on the 
functioning of society. In his 1927 essay on the Social Classes (‘Social classes 
in an ethically homogenous environment’), Schumpeter writes the following 
in referring to the Marxian analysis of investment:
Manifestly, the captures surplus value does not invest itself but must be invested. 
This means on the one hand that it must not be consumed by the capitalist, and 
on the other hand that the important point is how it is invested. Both factors lead 
away from the idea of objective automatism to the fi eld of behavior and motive 
– in other words, from the social ‘force’ to the individual–physical or family; 
from the objective to the subjective. […] But the crucial factor is that the social 
logic or objective situation does not unequivocally determine how much profi t 
shall be invested, and how it shall be invested, unless individual disposition is taken 
into account. Yet when that is done, the logic is no longer inherent solely in the 
system as distinct from the individuality of the industrialist himself. (Schumpeter 
[1927] 1951, p. 155).
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For Schumpeter, the task of  the social scientist is, therefore, to study 
individual specifi cities as well as their context embedded in the reality of 
social structures. 
Schumpeter’s reference to these structures, and, in particular, to the 
division of society into social classes does not impair the methodological 
individualism of the author. For Schumpeter:
The ultimate foundation on which the class phenomenon rests consists of individual 
differences in aptitude. What is meant is not differences in an absolute sense, but 
differences in aptitude with respect to those functions which the environment 
makes ‘socially necessary’ – in our sense – at any given time. (ibid., p. 210)
Thus, for Schumpeter, the degree of  self-interest and class interest 
for agents varies according to the social context. If  one considers, for 
example, ‘traditional’ societies, interest for the group and holism prevail. 
If, on the other hand, one is interested in market economies, which is the 
case for part of the fi eld of pure economics, the individualistic approach 
becomes essential.
These developments are radically different from the approaches of 
both von Mises and Hayek, whose explicit purpose was to explain the 
functioning of markets in an individualistic and subjectivist way. For his 
part, Schumpeter combines, in an eclectic way, the methods of individualism 
and holism, and examines the problems of rules and agent beliefs within 
this framework. This is also the key to reading Schumpeter’s remark which 
states that ‘it is society that shapes the particular desires we observe [… and] 
the fi eld of individual choice is always, though in very different ways and 
to very different degrees, fenced in by social habits or conventions and the 
like’ (Schumpeter 1934, p. 91).
This position is obviously unusual within the Austrian tradition, which 
is not favourably disposed towards methodological holism a priori. Indeed, 
in complete contradiction with Hayek and von Mises, Schumpeter does not 
hesitate to underline that social classes are not ‘our making’ or a ‘creation 
of the researcher’ but ‘social entities that we observe’, or ‘social organisms, 
living, acting and suffering as such’ (Schumpeter [1927] 1951, p. 137).
3.4.2 From Motives to Routines
Following Hayek, and unlike von Mises, Schumpeter accepts the possibility 
of beliefs or unconscious motives for agents. These can be of two types.
First, agents who are present in market economies have substantial but 
unconscious traces of collective beliefs inherited from the past and accepted 
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within certain social groups. Modern economic rationality is not, for 
Schumpeter, a natural given fact but a slow and progressive construction.
So, the behaviour of  agents is the result of  motives, beliefs and 
composite determinants which well illustrate the mixture of holism and 
individualism advanced by Schumpeter. Agent behaviour indeed results 
from the combination of a rational motive based on the pursuit of self-
interest and from collective beliefs unconsciously inherited from the past. 
From this angle, economic rationality itself  is not a natural characteristic 
of agents but rather a kind of collective belief  in the need to apply three 
principles to a growing segment ‘of the sector of social life’ (Schumpeter, 
1942, p. 122): 
First, by trying to make the best of a given situation more or less – never wholly 
– according to their own lights; second, by doing so according to those rules of 
consistency which we call logic; and third, by doing so on assumptions which 
satisfy two conditions: that their number be a minimum and that everyone of 
them be amenable to expression in terms of potential experience’ the utility of 
the economic calculation based on optimization; the acceptance of the ‘rules’ of 
usual logic; the use of simple hypotheses based on experience. (Ibid)
There are also other unconscious motives in Schumpeterian agents. They 
concern the weight of the past and the experiences to which it has given rise. 
These experiences are linked to the personal trajectory of an agent and they 
infl uence him unconsciously by limiting the scope of the possible behaviours 
he is able to conceive of. So, if  the agent does not see any reason to change 
his activity, he will adopt a behaviour based on a mere extrapolation from 
circumstances that have occurred in the past. This explains the existence 
of real routines that contribute to create what the individual considers to 
be ‘normality’ (Schumpeter, 1939, p. 4). Reference to this normality allows 
the agent to formulate a structural belief, what Schumpeter calls a ‘full 
idea of that logic which is inherent in economic things and which it is the 
task of scientifi c economics to formulate somewhat more rigorously’ (ibid., 
p. 5). The kind of experience described above also affects the idea an agent 
forms about the situation of the environment through observation. We are 
hinting at ‘the rules by which [the agent] form[s] his judgment about existing 
business situations’ (ibid).
It is this ‘situation’ that implies that ‘all knowledge and habit once 
acquired becomes as fi rmly rooted in ourselves as a railway embankment 
in the earth’ (Schumpeter 1934, p. 84). Schumpeter here evokes the existence 
of  real rules of  conduct inherited from an agent’s personal trajectory as 
well as from autonomous social factors, which sink into the ‘strata of [his] 
subconsciousness’ (ibid.).
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3.4.3 The Weight of the Diffusion of Beliefs
In compliance with his Wieserian conception of economic sociology, and 
in line with an Austrian characteristic already identifi ed in von Mises and 
Hayek, Schumpeter considers that, whatever the social environment that 
is considered, people always divide into two groups: leaders and imitators. 
Schumpeter does not consider the former as superior beings or ‘great men’ 
(Schumpeter [1927] 1951, p. 216). They do not possess specifi c intellectual 
qualities which would lead them to play a pre-eminent role of a particular 
kind. However, they do have to exercise the both individual and social 
function of leadership, which is ‘to command, to prevail, to advance’ (ibid., 
p. 217).
The motives of  the leaders are linked to their ‘instinctive urge to 
domination’ (Schumpeter [1919] 1951, p. 15), or to their ‘excess of energy’ 
(ibid., p. 34). These ‘urges’ – or Trieb (ibid., p. 83) – express the fact that 
the motives of the leaders are more connected to their ‘instinct’, a fact that 
explains their creativity and entails permanent changes in the sphere to 
which they belong. The imitators are characterized essentially by a behaviour 
based on the pursuit of habits as described in the previous section. They 
generally adopt a passive role and contribute by diffusing the beliefs, rules 
or innovations of the leaders. They can help reinforce these beliefs or rules 
and improve their dissemination in society as whole, by adopting imitative 
behaviour or by demonstrating their confi dence in the decisions of  the 
leaders. They can also resist them, by postponing the processes of diffusion 
or sometimes by preventing their mechanisms from working altogether.
The phenomenon of  ‘leadership’ is not independent from the social 
context within which it appears. Thus, when referring to warlike civilizations, 
Schumpeter insists on the fact that leadership results from the excess energy 
of individuals but also contributes to the social reproduction of the group 
to which they belong. 
The social phenomenon of leadership also contributes to the explanation 
of institutional change. Indeed, unlike the imitators, the leaders do not agree, 
partly unconsciously, to conform to the dominant rules and to minimize 
their efforts in order to reach a given objective. On the contrary, they adopt 
a conscious behaviour of innovation and, from individual beliefs of a new 
type, they invent new rules intended to attain new objectives. This invention 
– or more exactly, this innovation – requires the production of an effort. 
Leaders can make this effort because they have an excess of energy that is 
obviously useless when individual behaviour relies on routines and appears 
in a purely ‘hedonistic’ form. 
The success of an economic or social innovation does not, however, depend 
on its intrinsic characteristics but on its acceptance by the community of the 
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imitators. Imitators can show resistance to change an inclination towards 
routine behaviour. Schumpeter analyzes the reasons for this. One of these 
is particularly interesting in this context because it concerns the existence 
of a confl ict between two forms of beliefs: those based on routine lead us 
to view changes as destabilizing factors, affecting established interests and 
increasing potential uncertainty; the others, on the contrary, lead us to see 
innovation as a factor of economic or social progress (Schumpeter 1939, 
p. 100). 
One thus recognizes, in Schumpeter, a process of diffusion and sharing 
of beliefs similar to those found in von Mises and Hayek in many respects. 
One notes, however, that Schumpeter attaches specifi c importance to history 
and economic sociology in the analysis of this process.
3.4.4 The Weight of Class Interest 
When considering social classes as ‘social entities’, Schumpeter is quite 
naturally led to analyze the concept of class interest, which seems holist a 
priori. Schumpeter defi nes social classes as ‘social entities which we observe 
but which are not our making’ (Schumpeter [1927] 1951, p. 137). In this way, 
social classes can be considered as distinctive ‘living, acting, and suffering’ 
entities that must be ‘understood as such’ (Ibid.). More exactly, for our 
author, a social class is a group of individuals who are capable, within a 
specifi c social context, of exercising a given social function. 
This is why Schumpeter does not think that it is possible to defi ne social 
classes on either a purely holistic or a purely individualistic basis:
We cannot help those who are unable to see that the individual is a social fact, 
the psychological an objective fact, who cannot give up toying with the empty 
contrasts of the individual vs. the social, the subjective vs. the objective. (ibid., 
p. 211).
This characteristic of  social classes explains why class interest may exist 
as such and why belonging to a social class infl uences an individual; his 
behaviour, in fact, does not only depend on his own will but also on what 
Wieser called the ‘forces of compulsion’ (Wieser 1927, p. 155). It would be 
inaccurate to attribute to Schumpeter a defi nition that would make of the 
social class the outcome of shared beliefs among its members. Schumpeter 
is extremely clear on this point:
Class is something more than an aggregation of class members. It is something 
else, and this something cannot be recognized in the behavior of the individual 
class member. A class is aware of its identity as a whole, sublimates itself  as such, 
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has its own peculiar life and characteristic ‘spirit’. (Schumpeter 1951 [1927], 
p. 140).
Therefore, according to Schumpeter, a social class is an autonomous entity 
which gives rise to collective beliefs (and not the other way around). That is 
why Schumpeter does not hesitate to refer to ‘class interest’ and to suggest 
a convergence of the vision of the world among members of a social class 
(ibid., p. 140). The class interest ever-present in all members of this class thus 
constitutes an autonomous social determinant ‘originally quite independent 
of [their] will’ (ibid., p. 143).
To summarize, the conception of beliefs developed by Schumpeter differs 
sharply from the ones of von Mises and Hayek. On the one hand, Schumpeter 
puts forward the idea that any economic action entails individual motives 
as well as autonomous social determinants. This clearly makes him stand 
apart from the subjectivist individualism of Hayek and von Mises. On the 
other hand, Schumpeter admits the existence of collective beliefs peculiar to 
each social class; this constitutes a further divergence from Hayek and von 
Mises since none of them, while sticking to the notion of shared individual 
beliefs, ever admitted this notion. 
Conversely, one fi nds in Schumpeter the Austrian idea of the diffusion 
of  beliefs by innovation/imitation, but, unlike in Hayek for example, its 
introduction is not intended to justify the existence of a natural tendency 
of the economy to converge towards a unique equilibrium. One recognizes 
here the complexity of the short-term as well as long-term Schumpeterian 
dynamics and the importance attached to the role of economic sociology 
(cf. for instance, contributions dedicated to this dynamics in Arena and 
Dangel-Hagnauer 2002).
We have now reached the limits of Schumpeter’s approach. If his eclecticism 
allows him to provide us with a more relevant conception of  economic 
evolution from the viewpoint of its empirical scope, it also entails a certain 
number of inadequacies. The one that we most want to emphasize here is 
the absence of a true economic explanation of the formation of collective 
beliefs. In Schumpeter’s mind, this explanation falls essentially within the 
province of  economic sociology, though economic sociology would be 
unable to provide a satisfactory answer to the economists in this context. 
This absence of a solution is partly the result of an unsatisfactory economic 
analysis in Schumpeter of the ways in which social interaction works.
3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our analysis has shown the great variety of approaches to the problem 
of beliefs in the economy within the Austrian tradition. Although this 
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fact is not completely surprising for a reader familiar with the history of 
economic thought, its examination has the virtue of  highlighting three 
types of  solution to the problem. The approach put forward by von 
Mises consists in refusing any form of  social or collective belief  and 
in interpreting the processes of  co-ordination through the sharing of 
individual beliefs. Hayek admits to the existence of  a social kind of 
knowledge, which is both superior and different from the sum of individual 
types of knowledge, but denies individuals or groups of individuals the 
possibility of  appropriating it; the ‘knowledge of  society’ is, therefore, 
only a necessary analytical device. Finally, Schumpeter’s analysis admits 
the possibility of collective beliefs and also develops the thesis according 
to which these beliefs affect the actions of both individuals and groups 
of individuals.
The Austrian tradition thus provides a considerable – though not 
exhaustive – overview of  possible angles from which this problem 
could be tackled thereby also illustrating its importance. In this sense, 
it is striking to notice how many questions which appear new to many 
contemporary economists seemed natural to economists who, in their 
time, refused to allow their discipline to become divorced from the other 
social sciences.
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